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DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS: THE CASE OF PERFECT CORRELATION
Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

ABSTRACT

I study the pollution control problem faced by an imperfectly informed supranational
governmental authority (SNGA) that wishes to design an international environmental agreement
(lEA) for developing countries (DC). The SNGA cannot contract directly with polluting firms in
the various DCs; it must deal with such firms through their national governments. Further, owing
to national sovereignty, the SNGA is unable to either monitor the actions of DC governments and
firms or enforce the terms of the lEA in the event of a contractual breach. In this setting, I study the
properties of equitable lEAs in which similar DCs are held to similar environmental standards. In
particular, I focus on two cases. In the first case, governments and firms within individual DCs do
not collude among themselves, and, in the second case, they do. I show that when the private
information of firms and governments across the two DCs is perfectly correlated, whether or not
there is collusion, the SNGA can always implement the full information lEA in a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium. My analysis tells us that (i) the significance of the monitoring and enforcement problem
in such international settings has been exaggerated, and (ii) the technological similarities between
DCs have a far greater bearing on the design problem than do the potentially deleterious effects of
sovereignty. Indeed, there are a number of situations in which Pareto-efficient lEAs can be designed
by the SNGA.
JEL classification: Q25, H77, D82
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DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS: THE CASE OF PERFECT CORRELATION l

1. Introduction

With the passage of time, it has increasingly been recognized that environmental protection
is a global issue. As noted by Bernauer (1995 , p. 354), the scope and significance of this issue have
been amply demonstrated by the events of the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio. At this Summit, it became
clear that if the northern nations of the world wanted " ... the environment to be secured for future
generations, [then they would] have to radically assist the South in choosing a different road to
development than the one they [had] currently [been] traveling on" (Rogers 1993, p. 27). Indeed,
to combat the evils of poverty and environmental degradation, developing countries (Des) have
demanded the transfer of resources and technology from developed countries. In such a contentious
J

setting, the success or failure to protect the environment will depend crucially on the ability of
international institutions to design effective international environmental agreements (lEAs)? Given
this, a key question becomes "How can international institutions, which necessarily respect the
principle of state sovereignty, contribute to the solution of difficult global problems?" (Keohane,
Haas, and Levy, 1993, p. 6). This is the central question that I propose to study in this paper.
On the academic front, only very recently have researchers begun to systematically study
issues relating to global environmental protection. As a result, many specific questions remain
unanswered. What kinds of contracts must a supranational governmental authority (SNGA) design
in order to get sovereign nations to voluntarily participate in lEAs in a noncooperative environment?
II thank Larry Karp for his input; the usual disclaimer applies. This research has been supported by USDA
Cooperative Agreement #1-440310-25241 , and by a Faculty Research Grant from Utah State University.

21n this paper I shall use the terms contract and lEA interchangeably.
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How is the lEA design question affected by the fact that the SNGA must deal with national
governments directly and polluting firms only indirectly? Are there circumstances in which the
SNGA can require that pollution be abated at the first-best level? Finally, given that the SNGA is
unable to monitor pollution abatement activities in sovereign nations, what steps can it take to
mitigate the effects of potential collusion between governments and firms in individual nations?3
These are the specific questions that I shall address in this paper.
Although my analysis is, in principle, applicable to any country, the hierarchical interaction
that I shall analyze is particularly relevant to DCs. Consequently, the reader should note that it is
these countries that I have in mind in the rest of this paper.4 In particular, I shall study the interaction
of the SNGA with governments and firms in two DCs. The SNGA designs lEAs in which two
technologically similar DCs are held to contractually similar environmental standards. This notion
of technological similarity is formalized by having: (i) the private information of the two polluting
firms, i.e. , the random quality component of the abatement technologies; and (ii) the private
information of national governments, i.e., the results of monitoring undertaken by the two
governments, be perfectly correlated. The reader should not interpret this perfect correlation
formalization literally. Given DC demands for the transfer of resources and technology from the
developed world, my purpose here is to study the properties of lEAs which are equitable in the sense
that they hold similar DCs to similar contractually specified environmental standards. The perfect
correlation formalization is an abstraction to this end.

3 As we shall see, circumstances will arise in which governments and flrms within individual Des will want
to collude to maximize the monetary transfers to be received from the SNGA.

4The countries I have in mind are those which would be eligible to receive monetary transfers under the Global
Environmental Facility's standard of$4,000 or less. For more on this, see Rogers (1993 , p. 155).
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My principal result is that when the private information of firms and governments in the two
DCs is very similar, i.e., perfectly correlated, regardless of whether there is collusion between
governments and firms in the individual countries, the SNGA can always implement the first-best
lEA in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. I now discuss the connections between my model and some of
the related literature concerning lEAs.

2. Environmental Protection, Agency Theory,
and the Economics of Hierarchies

Barrett (1994), Black, Levi, and de Meza (1993), Hoel (1992), and Sandler and Sargent
(1995) have all studied different aspects of lEAs. Barrett has observed that for lEAs to be
successful, they need to be self-enforcing. Black, Levi, and de Meza have determined the minimum
number of countries needed to make an lEA viable. Hoel has studied the properties of lEAs, which
require that pollutants be abated uniformly. Finally, Sandler and Sargent have shown that the
success of lEAs depends on how individual pollution activities add to the total level of pollution
experienced by nations. While these papers have certainly advanced our knowledge of some aspects
of" ... the multi-faceted design ... problem" (Black, Levi, and de Meza, 1993, p. 281), a number
of other important questions, which I discussed in section 1, remain unanswered. Consequently, I
now discuss my theoretical approach to the lEA design problem.
In the multi agent contract theory literature, Sappington and Demski (1983, hereafter SD) and
Demski and Sappington (1984, hereafter DS) have analyzed two-tiered hierarchies with one principal
and two agents. DS assume that the private information of the agents, across the two agents, is
positively but imperfectly correlated. SD assume that this information is perfectly correlated. SD

/
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show that in an environment with perfect correlation, the principal can always implement the first
best contract in dominant strategies. I shall extend the SD analysis by adding a third tier, and then
I shall study the properties of the lEAs that the SNGA can implement in a three-tiered hierarchy.
Three-tiered hierarchies with one principal, one intermediary, and one agent have been
studied by Tirole (1986, 1988), Kofman and Lawarree (1993), and by Batabyal (1996a, 1996b,
1996c).5 In these papers, the focus is on analyzing a hierarchy with a single "fork." I shall extend
this research by adding a second "fork" to the underlying hierarchy. In other words, my task will be
to study a two-forked, three-tiered hierarchy. Occupying the top tier of the hierarchy is the relevant
international institution or SNGA. This SNGA could be an organization such as the World Bank
in its role as an administrator of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) or the Commission on
Sustainable Development (CSD) created in Agenda 21 at the Rio Earth Summit. The second and
/

third tiers of the hierarchy consist of the national government and a representative polluting firm in
each of the two DCs. 6 The rationale for the actual contracting stems from issues including, but not
limited to, the harmful effects of nitrogen and/or sulphur emissions. The incidence of pollution may
be domestic or trans boundary .7
The uncertainty in my model stems from the SNGA's lack of knowledge about the quality
of the pollution abatement technology/capability available in each of the two DCs. Whereas the

5The Kofman and Lawarree (1993) paper actually has two intermediaries-an external and an internal auditor.
6The reader will note that in this modeling scheme, I have conferred on the SNGA the role of principal. As
a result, there is a distinct asymmetry in the assumed power ofthe SNGA as opposed to that of governments and fIrms.
Given that I am interested in DCs who typically have limited bargaining power in their interactions with international
organizations owing to the fact that their monetary contributions to the budgets of such organizations are minimal, this
hierarchical modeling scheme appears to be appropriate. For more on the power of SNGAs over DCs, see Mosley,
Harrigan and Toye (1991).
7See Crane (1993) or Paarlberg (1993) for a discussion of the relevance of international institutions when the
incidence of an environmental externality is domestic.
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polluting firm in each country always knows the quality of its technology and the government does
too in some states of nature, the SNGA is never privy to this information. As indicated previously,
the random variable denoting the private information about pollution abatement technology quality
is perfectly correlated across the two DCs. From the standpoint of pollution abatement, this means
that both countries are technologically very similar. The reader should think of sets of countries,
such as Ecuador and Peru, China, and the Philippines, or South Korea and Taiwan, which are
technologically very similar. The SNGA's task is to design an incentive compatible, in section 5
collusion-proof as well, lEA, which (i) is equitable in the sense that similar DCs are held to similar
environmental standards, and (ii) will lead to optimal pollution abatement. To the best of my
knowledge, this problem of designing lEAs for very similar DCs in a hierarchical framework has not
been studied before.
The reasons for wanting to study collusion between the polluting firm and the DC
government are threefold. First, while the DC government participates in the lEA because it
recognizes the value of appearing "green," this government also acts as the polluting firm's advocate.
This aspect of the problem will give rise to scenarios in which government/firm collusion becomes
a desirable option. 8 Second, the government and the firm in each country receive monetary transfers
for their roles in abating pollution. Further, both these players in each DC know that the SNGA
cannot monitor their activities owing to sovereignty, or for that matter, enforce the terms of the lEA
in the event of a contractual breach. Consequently, there will be circumstances in which there are
incentives for the government and the firm to collude to maximize the transfers received from the

8See Peterson (1993) for a discussion of some practical instances of possible government/firm collusion in an
international setting.
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SNGA. Third, as Mookherjee and Png (1995) and others have noted, corruption is an endemic part
of public life in many DCs. This suggests a need for explicitly modeling the actions of potentially
corruptible agents. Due to these reasons, an important part of this paper will consist of analyzing
collusion-proof contracts.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 3, I describe my model in detail, and
then I characterize the properties of the first-best lEA. In section 4, I study the above-described
three-tiered hierarchy with no collusion by firms and governments in the two DCs. In section 5, I
study the case of collusion by the government and the representative firm in each DC. In section 6,
I conclude and offer some suggestions for future research.

3. The Theoretical Framework
J

3a. Description of the Model
Superscripts A and B will denote the two countries, and subscripts i = 1, 2, 3,4 will refer to
the state of nature. In what follows, I shall focus on country A; the analysis is analogous for
country B. The risk-averse polluting firm in A produces clean air, whose output and value are
denoted by x

A, X A 2

o.

The polluting firm in A chooses a level of abatement a A > 0 , and this

firm's cost of abatement is (a A )2/2.9 This firm has a strictly concave and differentiable payoff from
abatement function B [ Ti1 - {( a / )2/2 } ] with 0 < JB [• ]/JTi1 <

00 ,

VTi1 . Ti1

transfer made by the SNGA to the A firm when it produces clean air

x/

2

0 is the monetary

and the B firm produces

9The use of this functional form is without loss of generality. All the results of this paper can be obtained by
using a general, increasing, and strictly convex abatement cost function.
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The A firm's reservation payoff is BAR = B [ TAR]; BAR and TAR are common

.

knowledge.
The government in A is risk averse. By employing a monitoring device, this government
receives a signal ~ from the firm regarding the quality of its abatement technology, and then it (the
government) sends a report y4 to the SNGA, indicating what it learned about the quality of this
technology/capability. In some states of nature, the government's monitoring device malfunctions,
and, hence in these states, the government will be unable to provide the SNGA with an informative

1
has a strictly concave and differentiable utility function V( G 1), where G 1is the monetary transfer
made to the A government when it reports r/ and the B government reportsr/ . I assume that
0< dV(e)/dG 1<
VG 1. TheA government's reservation utility is denoted by VAR = V(G AR);

report. Upon receiving y4 , the SNGA offers the A government a transfer Gi ~ O. The government
i

i

00 ,

i

i

./

VAR and GAR are common knowledge.

The reader should note that making reporting a key

government function is consistent with the government/SNGA interaction proposed for one specific
SNGA, namely, the Commission on Sustainable Development. As noted by Rogers (1993, p. 310),
a key aspect of this interaction involves the" ... Commission's . . . considering information provided
by governments ... "
The random variable

e

A

,

which incorporates the uncertainty about pollution abatement

technology quality, has binary support

[e AL , eAH] , where

0 < eAL < eAH . Let

Alternately put, the pollution abatement technology can be of low quality,

e

AL

,

L\e A = eAH - eAL.
or of high quality,

The SNGA is risk neutral and it has a welfare function defined over clean air, which takes
the form U = ~1(X I

-

GI

-

T ') , where the index I runs over A and B. The quantity of clean air

8

produced by each firm is x

I =

a' + e', I

=

A , B. As stated, the SNGA's welfare is the difference

between total clean air and the sum of government and firm transfers. 1O The SNGA designs the
contract, which it offers to the government and to the firm in A. The contract can only be
conditioned on what the SNGA actually observes, i.e., the A government's report y4, the B
government's report rB, the A firm's output of clean air x4, and the B firm's output of clean air r.
There are four states of nature, each occurring with probability Pi> 0, where ~Vi Pi = 1. The
random variables denoting abatement technology quality,

e

A

and

e

B

,

are perfectly correlated. The

lEA is ex ante , i.e., the SNGA, the government, and the firm in A sign the contract holding
symmetric but imperfect information about

eA.

The firm always knows

eAbefore

choosing

abatement. The government, on the other hand, mayor may not know eA. This depends on whether
the government's monitoring device functions or malfunctions. Alternately put, the government's
signal ~ mayor may not be informative. I can now characterize the four states. They are:
• State 1·.

eAI = eALI ' eBI = eBLI '

SIA

= el '
AL

SI B

= e1

BL
'

In state 1, firms and governments in both countries observe that the quality of the abatement
technology is low. In this state, the two-government monitoring mechanisms function and hence
they provide useful information. In state 2, both firms learn that the abatement technology quality

IOThe reader may be wondering about the source of these transfers. One possibility would be to conform to
the Rio Earth Summit document known as Agenda 21. According to this document, developed countries are supposed
to contribute 0.7% of their GNP for the purpose of environmental protection. For more details, see Rogers (1993, pp.
151-60). I have discussed issues related to the SNGA ' s budget, and contracting with budget balance constraints in
Batabyal (1996b).
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is low, but the two governments learn nothing. In this state, the two-government monitoring
mechanisms malfunction. In state 3, the two firms learn that the abatement technology quality is
high and the two governments learn nothing.

Once again, the two-government monitoring

mechanisms malfunction. Finally in state 4, firms and governments in both countries learn that the
abatement technology quality is high. The two-government monitoring mechanisms function
effectively in this state. I I I shall assume that PI > P2 and that P4 > P3. In other words, the two
monitoring mechanisms are reliable in the sense that they are more likely to function than to fail.
The timing of the game between the SNGA, theA government, and theA firm is as follows.
First, the SNGA offers the contract to the government and to the firm inA. Second, the firm learns

8A and the government receives its signal sA. Third, the firm chooses abatement cx,A. Fourth, clean
air ~ is produced by the firm and the government sends its report y4 to the SNGA, indicating what
it learned about 8 A • Finally, the SNGA compensates the government and the firm in A by making
monetary transfers G A (x

A, X B,

r

A,

r

B)

and T A (x

A, X B,

r

A,

r

B) .

In the remainder of this paper, I shall assume that the SNGA can verify the veracity of the
government report y4 . In other words, if the government signal sA is noninformative, then the
corresponding report y4 reflects this fact and the SNGA can verify that the true facts are indeed as
they have been reported. In symbols, SA = oA

==>

r

A

= OA . On the other hand, to keep the SNGA's

design problem interesting and to allow for the possibility of government/firm collusion, I shall
permit the government to lie and report that its signal is noninformative when in fact such is not the

I II have assumed that the governments always know when their monitoring devices malfunction.
More
involved formulations in which the governments do not know the states in which their monitoring devices have
malfunctioned are possible. These alternate formulations require additional constraints on the SNGA's problem, and
they make it very difficult to obtain concrete results.
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case. 12 That is, S A = 8A == r AE {8 A, OA}. This completes the description of my model. I now
consider the simplest case in which perfect information is acquired by the SN GA.

3b. The First-Best Optimum
In this case, the SNGA knows the pollution abatement technology quality 8 A and the firm ' s
pollution abatement choice. When this happens, the SNGA bypasses theA government and contracts
with the A firm directly. Since the government now has no role to play, it receives its reservation
transfer GAR

=

v -I(VAR)

in all four states of nature. The SNGA solves
(1 a)

The first-order necessary condition requires that
(1 b)
We see that in a first-best optimum, the marginal cost of pollution abatement, the LHS of (1 b), is set
equal to the marginal welfare from abatement. The optimal level of abatement a *A equals unity in
all four states of nature. The firm receives a transfer for abating pollution, which is independent of
the state of nature. This transfer equals [TAR

=

B -I (BAR) + 1/2], where 1/2 is the cost of pollution

abatement in the first-best optimum. I can now define this first-best optimum.

Definition: In the first-best optimum, (i) the government and the firm in each country are held to
their reservation utility and payoff, respectively, (ii) equation (1 b) holds, and (iii) the equilibrium
contract is Pareto efficient in every state.

12The reader will note that I have restricted the government's message space in certain states. Specifically, the
government can lie only in states 1 and 4. The government can also report the wrong state, but in my model, making
such a report is equivalent to obtaining a non in formative signal. While in principle this restriction can be relaxed by
allowing for an expanded range of governmental reporting options, from a practical standpoint, such an action would
make it very difficult to obtain concrete results. This is because relaxing the above restriction would lead to an increased
number of states and hence to more constraints on the SNGA's overall maximization problem.

./
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I now discuss the more interesting cases in which the SNGA cannot determine the quality
of the abatement technology, or the actual abatement undertaken by the A firm.

4. The No GovernmentlFirm Collusion Case

In this section, I shall disallow the possibility of collusion between the government and the
fum in A. When the A government is paid its reservation transfer GAR, it receives its reservation

utility VAl?, and hence it is fully insured. Furthermore, since I am not allowing for the possibility of
government/firm collusion and because the SNGA can verify the government's report by paying GAR,
the SNGA can obtain the A government's information at least cost. In terms of the design of the
main contract, this means that the three-tiered hierarchy effectively reduces to a two-tiered hierarchy
in which the A government plays a completely passive role.
In this setting, the SNGA solves
maxQiA '

TA~\j'
ii

I

A A
A
p I.(a I. + 8.I - T./I. )

(2a)

subject to

~\jiPi B[Ti: -{(a/)12}]z

BAR ,

P2[T2~ -{(a/)12}]z P2[T3~ -{(a3A +d8 A)12}],

(2b)
(2c)

and
(2d)
Constraint (2b) is the firm's participation constraint. Because the contracting is ex ante, I have a
single probabilistically weighted constraint. The need for this constraint arises from the fact that in
this international setting, the SNGA cannot compel the firm to participate in the lEA and abate
pollution. Constraints (2c) and (2d) arise because the SNGA has imperfect information about

12
abatement technology quality

A government's signal

~

e

A

in states 2 and 3. Recall that these are also the states in which the

is noninformative. Constraint (2c) says that in state 2, if the firm in B

A
abates pollution truthfully, then the firm in A should not abate at level a3 + ~eA and claim that the

state is 3. Similarly, constraint (2d) says that in state 3, given that the B firm is abating truthfully,
A
the A firm should not abate at level a 2 - ~eA and claim that the state is 2. In other words, these two

constraints are the Nash incentive compatibility constraints requiring theA firm to behave truthfully,
given that the B firm is behaving truthfully. I can now solve the SNGA's problem as stated in
(2a)-(2d). I am led to

Theorem 1: The SNGA can implement the first-best lEA in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. This lEA
has the following features: (i) the SNGA obtains the government's information at least cost, (ii) the
government's reward equals

GAR =

V-I (V AR) in all states ofnature, (iii) only constraint (2b) binds,
./

(iv) the pollution abatement levels satisfy a/ = a*A = 1, Vi, (v) the transfers to the firm satisfy

TI1 = T2~ = T3~ = T4~' (vi) the contract is Pareto efficient in every state, and (vii) the two
"out-of-equilibrium"

T3~ < T2~

+

~eA{(~eAI2)

+

transfers

satisfy

T2~ < T3~

+

~eA {(~eA/2) - I},

and

I}.

Proof' See the Appendix.
Comparing Theorem 1 with the definition of the first-best optimum in section 3b, it is easy
to verify that the contract described in Theorem 1 does indeed implement the first best. Theorem 1
describes the level and pattern of pollution abatement that one may expect to observe in my stylized
two-country setting in which the SNGA does not know the quality of the polluting firm's abatement
technology, and it must design an optimal lEA, which takes account of the organizational hierarchy.
Since the SNGA acquires the government's information in states 1 and 4 and because this

13

information is verifiable, the firm can be required to abate pollution at the first-best level. The
optimal contract then specifies equal monetary rewards to the firm in each of these two states.
Hence,

A

Til =

A

T44 ·

On the other hand, when the state is 2 or 3, the SNGA's information is imperfect. This
notwithstanding, Theorem 1 tells us that because: (i) the random variables denoting quality, OA and

OB, in A and Band (ii) the government signals

st

and

SB

are perfectly correlated, the SNGA can

exploit this fact to require that pollution be abated at the first-best level in states 2 and 3 as well.
Consequently, the monetary transfers to the firm are identical in all four states, 1.e.,

Intuitively, we can think of the SNGA placing the two polluting firms in a Prisoner' s
Dilemma game in states 2 and 3. By designing the out-of-equilibrium transfers so that they satisfy
the inequalities given in Theorem 1, the SNGA ensures that abating at the "correct" level is the
unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The results contained in Theorem 1 depend on the perfect
correlation of (i) the government signals, and (ii) the random variables denoting abatement
technology quality in the two countries. The reader can verify for himself that the first-best lEA can
also be implemented by the SNGA in a dominant strategy equilibrium.
At and since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, there has been considerable discussion about the
properties of politically acceptable and economically feasible lEAs. In particular, given DC
perspectives on the nature and causes of global environmental degradation, the equity aspect of lEAs
has become an important issue. \3 We have seen that as long as governments and firms in individual
DCs do not collude, a SNGA which cares about world pollution can use the technological similarity

13For more on this, see Bernauer (1995), Keohane, Haas, and Levy (1993), and Rogers (1993).
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ofDCs to design an lEA which is equitable and which mimics the first-best lEA. The designed lEA
is equitable in the sense that technologically very similar DCs are held to identical pollution
abatement standards and the transfers made to the relevant parties in the two countries are also very
similar. Moreover, this lEA, described in Theorem 1, mimics the first-best lEA because it satisfies
the requirements of the definition of the first-best optimum given in section 3b.
Thus far, we have seen that it is certainly possible to design equitable lEAs; such equitable
lEAs hold groups of similar DCs to similar environmental standards. Consequently, such lEAs and
the monetary transfers that come with participation in these lEAs should be politically acceptable
to DCs. However, given the incentives for government/firm collusion in the individual DCs, there
is some question as to the robustness of these equitable lEAs. I now explore this robustness issue
by studying the design of collusion-proof lEAs.
/

5. The GovernmentlFirm Collusion Case

Recall that, because of national sovereignty, the SN GA is unable to monitor the actions of
governments and firms in A and B or enforce the terms of the lEA in the event of a contractual
breach. Since the SNGA can never acquire the firm's private information and because it must rely
on the government's report r4 to design the optimal contract, it is of considerable interest to
determine the nature of the optimal lEA that can be implemented by the SNGA when the
government and the firm in each of the two countries collude to maximize the total transfers to be
received from the SNGA.
I shall model collusion between the government and the firm as follows.

Before the

resolution of the uncertainty regarding abatement technology quality and at the time of signing the

15
main contract, the firm and the government in each country sign a side contract that entails the offer
and acceptance of a bribe from the firm to its government. This side contract is unobservable by the
SNGA. The bribe can only be conditioned on what the firm and the government both observe, i.e.,
the government's report,-A and clean air x4. With the offer and acceptance of the bribe, the firm's
total transfer becomes {T A( .)
{ G A ( .) + b A (x

A,

-

b A (x

r A) } , where b A (. ,

A,

.)

r

A)}

and the government's total transfer becomes

is the bribe. I shall not concern myself with the question

of how the surplus from the bribe is divided. For my purpose, it is only necessary that the bribe be
paid by the firm to its government.
Collusion by the firm and the government in each country alters the incentives of the various
parties but not, as we shall see, the properties of the optimal lEA designed by the SNGA. To see
why the firm inA might want to bribe its government, consider state 4. In this state, the government
is indifferent between reporting that it has observed 8 AH and reporting that it has observed OA. The
firm, on the other hand, would prefer that the government report OA. This is one instance in which
a clear rationale exists for the firm to bribe its government. 14
In order to formulate and solve the SNGA's problem when there is collusion, I shall follow
Tirole (1986, 1988) and Batabyal (1996b, 1996c).15 This method involves the imposition of
constraints in addition to the usual participation and incentive compatibility constraints. These
additional constraints are designed to preclude government/firm collusion and hence make the main
contract collusion proof. The reader should note that in this section I am considering simultaneous
collusion in both countries. The optimal lEA designed by the SNGA for A is collusion proof on the

14See footnote 8 as well.
15For a somewhat different approach to modeling collusion, see Kofman and Lawarree (1993).
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assumption that, if the resulting lEAs were not constrained to be collusion proof, government/firm
coalitions would form in both DCs. The reader will note that this assumption of "simultaneous
collusion" is weaker than the assumption which requires that the contract for A be collusion proof,
irrespective of whether there is collusion in B. I can now formulate the SNGA's problem. The
SNGA solves 16

(3 a)
subject to (2b), (2c), and (2d) with

T i:

replaced with ~: ,

~'tfiPi V(Gi: ) ~ VAR ,

(3b)

(3c)

/

(3d)

(3e)
and
(3f)

Constraint (3 b) is the government's participation constraint. Constraint (3 c) tells us that the
government should not be able to bribe the firm to lie in state 2 and abate pollution at the level
appropriate for state 3. Similarly, constraint (3d) tells us that the government should not be able to
bribe the firm to abate pollution in state 3 at the level appropriate for state 2. Constraints (3e) and
- A

- A

16The collusion-proof transfers are denoted by G II.. and T..II , respectively.
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(3f) are the core collusion constraints. The purpose of these two constraints is to make the solution
to the SNGA's problem collusion proof. Recall that in states 1 and 4, the government's signal ~
about the firm's abatement technology quality is informative. Thus, in these two states, the
government can hide this fact. Given this, constraints (3e) and (3f) tell us that should the firm
successfully bribe its government, the total sum of transfers less the cost of pollution abatement in
states 1 and 4 cannot be less than the corresponding total in states 2 and 3, respectively. Solving the
SNGA's problem (3a) subject to (2b )-(2d) and (3b )-(3 f) , I can state

Theorem 2: In the three-tiered hierarchy with government/firm collusion, the SNGA can implement
the first-best lEA in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
( 1.)

W'
a i A = a *A = 1 , v
1,

( •• )

11

This contract has the following features:

. c : ' fy G- A
G- A
G-33A = G-44'
A
th e government translers
satIs
11 = 22 =

( ... )
111

th e filrm

transfers satisfy fl~ = f2~ = f3~ = f4~' (iv) only the government and firm participation constraints
bind, (v) the optimal lEA is Pareto efficient in all four states, and (vi) the four "out-of-equilibrium"
transfers

satisfy

-A
T- 23A < T33

+

il8 A{( il8 A
/2) - 1 } ,

Proof' See the Appendix.
To intuitively verify that the lEA described in Theorem 2 is indeed collusion proof, I have
to show that constraints (2b)-(2d) and (3b)-(3f) are satisfied. By part (iv) of the theorem, we see
- A

- A

- A

- A

that constraints (2b) and (3 b) are satisfied. Because T23 , T32 , G23 ' and G32 do not enter the
SNGA's welfare function or the government and the firm utility and payoff functions, they can be
set by the SNGA so as to ensure strict inequality in (2c), (2d), (3c), and (3d). Thus, these four
constraints are satisfied. Finally, by parts (i), (ii), and (iii) of the Theorem and the reliability
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assumptions PI > P2 andp4 > P3' we see that constraints (3e) and(3f) are satisfied. Thus, this lEA
is collusion proof.
To intuitively check that the lEA described in Theorem 2 does indeed implement the first
best, recall the definition of the first-best optimum from section 3b. First, note that by part (iv) of
the Theorem, the government and the firm are both held to their reservation utility and payoff,
respectively. Second, criterion (ii) of the definition is satisfied because part (i) of the lEA requires
that pollution be abated at the first-best level in every state of nature. Finally, the fact that the lEA
is Pareto efficient in every state follows from condition (v) of the Theorem.
If the SNGA does indeed offer the lEA with the characteristics described in Theorem 2, then
its total monetary transfers cannot be altered by changing the government's report or the firm's level
of pollution abatement. As a result, the SNGA can be sure that its monetary obligations will be those
described in Theorem 2. This is so because the equilibrium lEA is collusion proof. Alternately put,
the SNGA designs the best possible lEA from the set of feasible lEA's that are constrained to be
collusion proof. Following the intuition of the previous section, the lEA described in Theorem 2 can
be thought of as an incentive scheme which effectively places the governments and the firms in the
two DCs in Prisoner's Dilemma games. By appropriately designing the "out-of-equilibrium"
transfers, the SNGA is able to ensure that misrepresentation of private information does not pay.
In other words, truthful pollution abatement and truthful reporting constitute a unique Bayes-Nash
equilibrium in the games for the governments and the firms.
Theorem 2 says that like in the no-collusion case studied in the previous section, the SNGA
can implement the first-best lEA in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, even when firms and governments
in the two DCs collude to maximize the monetary transfers to be received from the SNGA. This is
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a strong result and it has two significant practical implications. First, this result tells us that the
concerns of scholars, such as Krasner (l983a, 1983b), who have argued that sovereignty substantially
weakens the position ofSNGAs and hence the lEAs that such authorities may design, is misplaced. 17
By explicitly modeling the effects of sovereignty, i.e., by disallowing the possibility of monitoring
and enforcement and by allowing for the possibility of collusion, I have shown that the SNGA's lack
of monitoring and enforcement powers does not preclude it from designing the first-best lEA, i.e.,
the lEA it would design in the absence of any informational imperfections.
Second, the results of Theorems 1 and 2 greatly strengthen the case for designing lEAs,
which have four common structural features. First, these lEAs are individually rational for the DC
players, i.e., they satisfy certain participation constraints.

Second, these lEAs are incentive

compatible because they ensure that misrepresentation of private information by firms and
/

governments is not profitable. 18 Third, these lEAs are collusion proof, i.e., they are immune to the
existence of government/firm collusion in the individual DCs. Fourth, these lEAs involve relative
performance evaluation.

In an lEA with relative performance evaluation, very similar DCs

(i) receive similar monetary transfers for participating in an lEA, and (ii) are held to similar pollution
abatement standards. As a result, such lEAs are equitable and hence more likely to be acceptable
to DCs from a political standpoint.

17Also see Batabyal (1996a).
18The reader should note that incentive compatibility is a key feature of the lEA design problem faced by the
SNGA. An incentive incompatible lEA would be oflittle interest because in such an lEA, there would be no conformity
between the actions that are desired by the SNGA and the actions that are actually taken by governments and fIrms in
the individual Des.
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6. Conclusions

In this paper I analyzed the question of designing equitable lEAs for technologically similar
DCs in an environment in which a SNGA' s ability to design contracts is limited by the effects of
national sovereignty and by the existence of informational imperfections. In particular, I modeled
the institutional setting for the underlying problem as a two-forked, three-tiered hierarchy, and then
I studied the nature of optimal ex ante lEAs, both without and with collusion. Two general policy
conclusions emerge.
First, because the SNGA can implement the first best lEA irrespective of whether there is
collusion, in a practical setting, the lEA design question will depend fundamentally on the extent to
which an SNGA can exploit similarities in the pollution abatement technologies of the various
countries. If two given DCs are very similar technologically so that the pollution abatement
technologies of firms are also very similar, then the abatement technology quality parameters, i.e.,

e

A

and

e

B

,

are likely to be strongly and positively correlated. In the limiting case of perfect

correlation, the SNGA can engage in relative performance evaluation to great effect.
Second, the monitoring and enforcement problem stemming from national sovereignty is not
as much of an issue as some scholars would have us believe. As we have seen, the SNGA can get
around this aspect of the problem by designing collusion-proof contracts. In this connection, once
again, the more important issue concerns the similarities in the quality of the pollution abatement
technologies of countries with which the SNGA is attempting to contract.
The analysis of this paper and those of Batabyal (l996b, 1996c) together provide
considerable support for the view that lEAs are not inherently doomed due to a basic monitoring and

J
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enforcement problem stemming from national sovereignty. Indeed, as we have seen in this paper,
there are a number of situations in which the contractually mandated pattern of pollution abatement
is ideal, i.e., first-best.
The line of research pursued in this paper can be extended in a number of different directions.
I suggest two possible extensions. First, examining the lEA design problem in a multiperiod setting
will enable one to analyze issues such as credibility, commitment, and the possible gains from
ongoing relationships. As noted by Parson (1993), our experience with the Montreal Protocol has
shown that these are important issues in long-term contracting. Second, the analysis of this paper
can be extended by studying alternate institutional scenarios. One possibility would be to analyze
a bargaining framework in which DC governments bargain among themselves to decide what the
environmental objectives of a SNGA should be. Given the general, albeit uneven, desire for global
J

environmental protection, one may look forward to significant new developments in this area in the
future.

References

Barrett, S. 1994. Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements. Oxford Economic
Papers 46:878-94.
Batabyal, A. A. 1996a. An Agenda for the Design and Study of International Environmental
Agreements. Ecological Economics 19:3-9.
Batabyal, A. A. 1996b. Developing Countries and Environmental Protection: The Effects of
Budget Balance and Pollution Ceiling Constraints. Forthcoming, Journal of Development
Economics.
Batabyal, A. A. 1996c. Developing Countries and Environmental Protection: The Effects of Ex
Ante Versus Ex Post Contracting. Forthcoming, Journal of Regional Science.

22
Bernauer, T. 1995. The Effect of International Environmental Institutions: How We Might Learn
More. International Organization 49:351-77.
Black, J. , Levi, M. , and de Meza, D. 1993. Creating a Good Atmosphere: Minimum Participation
for Tackling the "Greenhouse Effect." Economica 60:281-93.
Crane, B. 1993. International Population Institutions: Adapting To a Changing World Order. In
P. Haas, R. Keohane, and M. Levy (eds.), Institutions for the Earth, Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press.
Demski, J. S., and Sappington, D. 1984. Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents.
Journal ofEconomic Theory 33:152-71.
Hoel, M. 1992. International Environment Conventions: The Case of Uniform Reductions of
Emissions. Environmental and Resource Economics 2: 141-59.
Keohane, R., Haas, P. , and Levy, M. 1993. The Effectiveness of International Environmental
Institutions. In P. Haas, R. Keohane, and M. Levy (eds.), Institutions for the Earth,
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Kofman, F., and Lawarree, J. 1993. Collusion in Hierarchical Agency. Econometrica 61:629-56.
/

Krasner, S. 1983a. Regimes and the Limits of Realism. In S. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes,
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Krasner, S. 1983b. Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening
Variables. In S. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Mookherjee, D., and Png, I. 1995. Corruptible Law Enforcers:
Compensated? Economic Journal 105:145-59.

How Should They Be

Mosley, P., Harrigan, 1., and Toye, 1. 1991. Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-Based
Lending in the I980s. London, UK: Routledge.
Paarlberg, R. 1993. Managing Pesticide Use in Developing Countries. In P. Haas, R. Keohane, and
M . Levy (eds.), Institutionsfor the Earth, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Parson, E. A. 1993. Protecting the Ozone Layer. In P. Haas, R. Keohane, and M. Levy (eds.),
Institutions for the Earth, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Peterson, M. J. 1993. International Fisheries Management. In P. Haas, R. Keohane, and M. Levy
(eds.), Institutionsfor the Earth, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

23
Rogers, A. 1993. The Earth Summit. Los Angeles, CA: Global View Press.
Sandler, T., and Sargent, K. 1995. Management of Transnational Commons: Coordination,
Publicness, and Treaty Formation. Land Economics 71:145-62.
Sappington, D., and Demski, 1. S. 1983. Multi-Agent Control In Perfectly Correlated
Environments. Economics Letters 13:325-30.
Tirole, 1. 1986. Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations.
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 2:181-214.
___ . 1988. The Multicontract Organization. Canadian Journal of Economics 21 :459-66.

/

24

Appendix

In this appendix, I provide the proofs of the two theorems stated in the text of the paper.
Both proofs involve Kuhn-Tucker analysis.

Proof of Theorem 1: T2~ and T3~ do not enter the SNGA's welfare function or the firm's
payoff function. Hence, these two transfers can be chosen by the SNGA so that (2c) and (2d) are
slack at the optimum. The Lagrangian is $£ = ~\jiPi(XiA - Ti1) + (Xl {~\jiPiB[ Ti1 where

(XI

is the multiplier associated with (2b). Note that for i

=

{(a/ )12} ]- BAR},

1, 2, 3, 4, the Lagrangian depends

a/ only through [a/ - Ti1] and [Ti1 - {(a/ )12} ]. Thus Vi, it suffices to maximize
[a/ -{(a/}12}] over a/. This maximization yields a/ = a*A = 1. In other words, the first-best

on

level of pollution abatement results in all four states. The remaining first-order necessary conditions
are (XIB I[ Ti1 - ( 112)] = 1,

Vi.

This tells us that the participation constraint binds, i.e., (XI > 0, and

that TI~ = T~ = T3~ = T4~' To verify that the optimal contract is Pareto efficient in every state,
note that in state 3, as in every other state,

{a B [. ]/aT3~}/{B /[. ] a3

A

}

= 1. That is, the marginal

payoff from pollution abatement equals the marginal cost of pollution abatement. Finally to obtain
the inequalities for the "out-of-equilibrium" transfers, substitute

a/

=

1,

Vi, into (2c) and (2d).

This completes the proof of Theorem 1. • •

-A -A
A
-A
Proof of Theorem 2: G23 , G32 , T23 , and T32 are not arguments of the SNGA's welfare
function, the government's utility function, or the firm's payoff function. Hence, these transfers can
be chosen by the SNGA so that (2c), (2d), (3c), and (3d) are slack at the optimum. The Lagrangian
is $£

=

~\jiPi(X/ - Gi: - ~:) + (Xl {~\jiPiB [.]

- BAR} + (X2 {~\jiPi V(·) - V AR } + 01 [PI [GI~

+

fl~

/
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P3

[G3~ + f3~ - {(a 3A ?12}

ll,

where exi' ai' i = 1,2 are the multipliers associated with (2b), (3b), (3e),

and (3f), respectively. The twelve first-order necessary conditions are (1) {alB I[ e] + 0 1
(2)

A

{ex 1BI[e] -01}a2 = 1,

{ex 1BI[e] -02}a/ = 1,

(3)

(4)

}a lA
A

{a}BI[e] +02}a4

(5) exIBI[e] +0 1 = 1 , (6) a 1BI[e] -0 1 = 1, (7) a 1BI[e] -02 = 1 , (8) alBI[e] +0 2
(9) a 2V I(e) +

aI

= 1, (10) ex 2 V I(e) - 0 1

=

1, (11) ex 2V I(e) - O2 = 1, and (12) a 2V I(e) + O2

1,
1,

1,

1.

I shall now proceed by means of six steps.

Step 1: The firm and the government participation constraints bind at the optimum.
Proof I have to show that ex i > 0, i = 1,2. Supposeal=O. Then(6)tellsusthat0 1 =-1,a
contradiction.

Suppose a 2 = O.

Then (11) tells us that O2

=

-1, a contradiction.

Hence,

ex i > 0, i = 1, 2 . •
Step 2:

a:

=

1

=

a/, Vi.
/

Proof· The result follows upon a pairwise comparison of(1) and (5), (2) and (6), (3) and (7) and (4)
and (8) . •

-A

-A

Proof· Suppose 0 1 > O. Then (3e) binds. Now (9) and (10) tell us that Gil> G22 , and (1) and
(2) tell us that

{fl~

- ( 1I2)} >

{f2~

- ( 112) }. Substituting these values into (3e) and recalling that

PI > P2' we see that (3e) is slack; this is a contradiction. Thus, 0 1 = O. A similar line of reasoning
using (3), (4), (11), (12), and P4 > P3' tells us that O2 = O. •
- A

-A

- A

- A

Step 4: Til = T22 = T33 = T44 •
Proof· This follows because 0 1 = O2

=

0, and because a:

Proof· This follows from the fact that 0 1 = O2

=

O. •

1 = a/, Vi .
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Step 6: The optimal lEA is Pareto efficient in all four states.
Proof· I have to show that the marginal rate of substitution between the transfer and abatement

equals unity.

I shall use the results of steps 2 and 3.

{aB [. ]la~:}/ {B 1[.] a/}

=

Note that for any state i,

1. Hence, the claim follows .•

Finally, to obtain the inequalities for the "out-of-equilibrium" transfers, substitute
ai

A

1, Vi, into (2c), (2d), (3c), and (3d). This completes the proof of Theorem 2 . • •

